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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
THELMA MADSEN and
DIANA LYNN MADSEN,
an infant by Thelma
Madsen, her parent
and natural guardian,
A· 12llants,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH
STATE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS, SAMUEL W. SMITH,
LEON HATCH, TAGE SPONBECK
and DOE I through DOE V.

)
)
)
)

)
)
)

)

Case No.

)
)

15215

)
)
)
)
)

)

Respondents.

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDE11T STATE OF UTA.B
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for wrongful death brought by Appellants, the wife and daughter of Thomas Madsen.

Thomas Madsen was

an inmate at the Utah State Prison at the time of his death
and appellants allege that respondents' negligence caused
Madsen's death.
DEPOSITION IN THE LOvJER OOURT
The trial Court, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, District
Judge, presiding, granted respondents' Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds that appellants' claim was barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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- 1 - OCR, may contain errors.

IlliLI

Respondents

se~

SOLGHT ON

JI.P"t-~AL

to have the·

motica to disDiss aff:crned and appc

:der grantins their
-_nts' appeal denieu.

S'l".::.T.Llli:UT OF TilE FACTS
Plaintiff's deceased husband, Thonas 1-ladse,-_, was
committed to the litah State Prison in July of 1972, on
the charge of selling dangerous drt.:·,:;.

The DE-cedent's

medical history at the Ctah State Prison showed that he
had a drug addiction problem of long standing and made
frequent complaints to people and doctors in and out of
the prison concerning aches and pains of his back an<:
joints.

As a consequence the decedent

m2~e

several visits

to the Veterans Administration Hospital to have these complaints evaluated.

Each time the institution concluded that

his complaints were merely emotional in origin and
reconunended treaterr.ent. of joint pains with arthritic type
medication.

The decedent had a

--~story

of making frequent

reques ·; for drugs to ease his various ills.

Notwithstanding,

this pri .- history of medica' conplaints and probl
decedent

;,.~i

not report.- l to sick call the week prior to his

death nor das there
chest pains.

s the

a~y

other record of his

On February

conplainin~

of

22, 1974, the decedent cafJe to the

prison dispensary requesting plastic surgery on his nose and
wrinkles on his face.

After thinking it over and getting

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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perr:.ission from the prison psychiatrist, the decedent returr_ d
on !iarch 1 for hi: clesired sursery.
que·

ic~s

In an:;v1ering the usual

before · ·.rgery the decedent denieJ any unusual

aches or pains , shortness of breath, or other symptoms of
illness.

Doctor Teal, the attending physician, found on

physical examination that the decedent was alert end rational.
1:

fL •: ·.her found there was no evidenc:c of any serious physic c.'..

preble·::.
The decedent underwent this facial surgery under local
anesthetic without complication.

lie received o::ly the

medications normally given in the prison operating facility.
Doctor Teal left the

~ospital

at 3:00p.m., and found

the ciecedent to be resting comfortably and to be in good condition.

At approxir..ately 6:00 p.m., the decedent experienced

a brief spell of rapid breathing but otherwise seemed to be
doing fine.

At 8:00p.m., a prison employee working in the

dispensary contacted a medical assistant and reported that the
decedent was h·;.v·ing some breathinc.; problc1s.

Upon arrival the

medical assistant cleared the decec.fCnt' s air passage and
gave him

.11._,, to :nouth res-5sci tation which conL..1ued until

an oxygen unit

arriv~d.

In the meantime the prison physician

was called and an ambulance was summoned; oxygen continued to
be aoministered.

In addition to

t .2

oxygen the medical

tecl•nician gave the decedent a shot of Epinephrine.
decedent was thcn transferred to the

Univ~rslty

The

Medical

Cent0r
1.·.~re
was
pronounced
duadprovided
on by
arrival.
Sponsored
by the S.J.he
Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
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A
ex

-~inins

post~ortem

doctor founc' L1at the cause c:

coronary insuf.;
sis with

cxawination 'oak plase in which the

.2ncy due to advance coronary atherosclero-

obstruc~ion

coronary arteries

C:eath \·.·as acute

(a

of the right
ma.~r

ant.~ior

descending

heart attack)

no~

There is

.ng

whie;h indicates that t·.c: dec-:dent would not have suffcreci .,
heart atta-.·

even if ti1e sire :ole surgery had not beer1 perforrnec

Res2ondents me red to dimiss t.he cornpla int befc:···-' the

trial court.

The ·.- ::-ial court g.: anted the motion to

c

nis

holding that the Governmental Immunity ll.ct is constitu::iona_
and that it prohibits appellants'

cau~~

of action.

The trial

court did not reach the question of whether Diana Lynn Mads(,:n
was a proper plaintiff in light of her failure to comf-'!.Y with
Utah Code Ann.

(19~3).

63-30-12 a. d 63-30-15

(T.

88-89;

45-84).
POINT I
THE UTAH GOV'
A.

·::\ENTAL H'U:!UNITY ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

JUDICIAL ST,C..N .. \RDS FOR REVIEHING THE CONSTITUTIC.N-

ALITY OF STATUTES.
In order to sustain the assertion that the Utah Governmental Ir.ununity Act, Ct.

Code Ann.

§

63-30-1 et

as amended, violates the Constitutions of the Unit-

1·

(1953),

States

and of Utah, appellants must overcor;1e the strong presur:1pt .>n

- 4provided
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of constitutional validity that accompanies legislative
enc.ctrnents.

This presumption of validity was clen.rly

sta'cecl by this Court in Greaves v. State, Utech, 528 P. 2d
805 (1974), wherein the Court held:
"In regard to the judicial determination
of the constitutionality of statutes there
are certain principles relating to statutory
construction, to be taken into consideration.
Because the duty rests upon the court to
determine the scope of the powers of all three
branches of government, they have a special
responsibility to exercise a high degree of
caution and restraint to keep themselves within
the limitations of the judicial power in order
not to infringe upon the prerogatives of the
executive or the legislative branches.
In harmony
with the policy it is the well-established rule
that legislative enactments are endowed with a
strong presumption of validity, and they should not
be declared unconstitutional if there is any
reasonable basis upon which they can be found
to come within the constitutional framework;
and that a statute will not be stricken down as
being unconstitutional unless it appears to be
so beyond a reasonable doubt. .
"
(Emphasis added.)
See also:

State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 2d 365, 463 P. 2d 806 (1970).

Respo·cdents submit that appellants failed to sustain
the burden necessary to overcome the strong presumption of
constitutional validity.

Appellants have merely cited

language and dicta to the effect that some judges and
commentators have found disfavor with certain grants of immunity to certain state and local governments.

This type of

argunent is not sufficient to satisfy the reasonable basic
standard set forth in Greaves, supra.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
- 5 Act,- administered by the Utah State Library.
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Secondly, it is a fundamental princi le of
law that judicial ruling on

th~

constitutional v

constitutio~
~idity

of

statutes should be avoided where it is possible to decide the
case on other grounds.

This position was well stoced in

,; )hnson v. RoLinson, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160 (1974):
"
it is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible
b~ which the (constitut: nal) question(s) may
2
avoided.'"
United Stat~3 v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 u.s. 363, 91 s.ct. 1400 (1971).
This Court took the same position in Clinton Citv
Patterson, 20 Utah 2d 70, 433 P. 20. 7 (1967), wherein it hdd:
. when a matter may be determined o:·.
grounds other than the validity of a
statute or ordin~~ce, it shoul~ be so determined, and if ~~ can sustain the trial court
without declari;ly a statute or ordinance
invalid, it is our duty to do so."
See also:

State v. Tritt,

~3

Utah 2d 365, 463 P. 2d 806 (1970:

Appellants argue that the Ui..ah Government .·l Inununity Act
is· unconstitutic1al as a denial of equal protection.

Appel-

lants support this argument by contending that a pri:;oner
treated at the prison hospital has more limited access to the
courts in case of injury resulting from the treatment than a
prisoner treated at another state hopsital.

This reasoning

is flawed in several ways.
First, appellants' argurr . nt is purely hypothetical.
It has not been established that Mr. Madsen

suf~ered

any

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ir,j ury uS the result of tJ·ea-Lrner.t at the prison hospital.

The lower court, in fact, never reached the issue of whether
ilr. Madsen was injured as a result of treatment received at
~he

prison hospital.

Therefore, this court is not properly

presented with an issue concerning unequal medical treatment
within the contexts of appeal.
Second, appellants conclude that a prisoner who
received injuries as a result of treatment at another state
hospital would have a cause of action, while a prisoner
rece~ving

would not.

ir.juries from treatment at the prison hospital
This conclusion is unsupported by case law or a

careful analysis of Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10 (10).
dents

Respon-

averthat the purpose of subsection (10) is to prevent

lav1sui ts by inmates against the state when an injury arises
out of the incarceration of any person.

As respondents

argue in Point II, infra., when the prison has control of
an inmate, injuries suffered by the inmate "arise out of
incarceration."

7herefore, whenever an inmate is injured

in a state hospital regardless of its location, recovery is
barred by the Government<.>.l In•muni ty Act.
Third, appellants fail to present a compelling reason
to abaondon the traditional rational basis test for determining the constitutionl validity of statutes based on the
police power of the state.

An analysis of the present case and

applicable statute indicate that iromunity from suit exists
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~herefore,

.cnever an injury arises out of i' carceration.
aJpellan

' equal protection

B.

THE UTAH

a~

GQ'.:ERN!·1£:;j_',- L

~~ent

must fail.

IE.: lUNITY ACT IS CotJST ITUTIO: ~l

The legislative .'nd judicial ilcceptance of the doctrine
of governmental irrununi::.! is overwhe L11ing.

I•Jhile man,·

:ris-

dictions, both sL\te ar.d federal, have waived govermc·-":.tal
irrununity for certain tyJes of suits, few have completely
abolished the doctrine.
The United States Supreme Court has continually
reaffirmed acceptance of governmental irrununity and has yet
to hold
is

·~at

its effect on actions against the

unconstit~tional.

349, 27 S.Ct.

526

D~ited

St-~es

In Kawanakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S.

(1907), the Court held:

"A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or absolute theory, but on the logical and practical
grounds that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes tl,e l.o on
which the right depends."
See also Mi:

3ota v. United States.

305 U.S. 382 (1939),

wherein the Urc.c. ted Sta t>es Supreme Court held that the exempt: or
of the United States fr-.m being sued without its consent even
extends to suits by

tt~

states,and stated that it rests with

Congress to determine whether the United States may be sue<J.
Id. at 387-388.

See also, Manr.o v. United StaL.es, :?03 U.S. 36

(1938).
-

8 -
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Un~e~

§~

the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.

2671-2680, the United States, like Utah, wo.ives gove
immunity exn.pt in ss;veral

specifi:~i

areas (see

§§

l346(b),
::,ental

2674, 2680).

The United States Supreme Court, in dealing with the constitutionality, objectives, and effects of the
maintained the pc

-~~~ion

~ct,

has always

that Congress does have the pmver to

Dalec:.cte v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct., 956 (1953),
an a ::·.ion was brought against the United States for wrongful
death under the Federal Tort Claims hct.

Indicating its

acceptance of and deferrence to the legislative purpose of
Congress, th_e Court said of the Act:
"Turning to the interpr.tntion of the
Act, our reasoning as to it~ applicability
to this disaster starts fro~ the accepted
jurisprudential principle that no action
lies against the United States unless the
legislature has authorized it.
The
language of the Act makes the United
States liable 'respecting the provisions
of this title relat~ng to tort claims,
in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individu~L under
like circumstances.'
28 u.s.c. § 2674,
28 u.s.c.A. § 2674.
This statute is
another example of the progressive
relaxation by legislative enactQents
cf th,-, rigor of the immunity rule.
Through such statutes that change the
law, organized government expresses
the social purposes that motivate its
legislation.
Of cours", these rr.odi_~jca
tions are entitled to ~ con5tructi~
that w1ll accor·,ollsh tr.e.1.r .ilm, tha; is,
one that w1ll cLrry out t~e leglslat1ve
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding-for 9
digitization
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puroose of allowing suits against the
Govermr.enL for ncs;ligence v:i tb cue
regilrd for the s:~atutory c'Xcept·.i_o: .. to
that policy.
In interpreting the
exceptions to the generality of the
grant, courts include only those circumstances which are within the words
and reason of the exception.
They
cannot do less since petitioners obtain
their 'right to sue from Congress (and
they) necessarily must take (that right)
subject to such restrictions as have
been imposed. ' Federal Housing
Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242,
251, 60 S.CT. 488, 493, 84 L.Ed. 724. II
(Emphasis added.)
See also:

Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 u.s. 605, 92 S.CT. 1891

(1972), and Indian Towing Company v. United States, 350
u.s. 61, 76 s.ct. 122 (1955).
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act is very similar
to the Federal Tort Claims Act because immunity is waived
for negligent acts of employees except in those areas
specifically exempted by statute, respondents submit,
therefore, that the acceptance of this type of statutory
approach to governmental immunity by the United States
Supreme Court,

supr~,

is controlling in the instant case.

Since Gillmor v. Salt Lake City,32 Utah 180, 89
Pac. 714 (1907), this Court strongly supported the application of the governmental immunity doctrine to suits brought
against the State of Utah.

Citing Gillmor,

supra, the

Court in Alder v. Salt Lake City, 64 Utah 568, 231 Pac.
1102 (1924), stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"The r · nciple o
law controlling the
li~bility
ci~ies
such cases is lai:
de ·n in Cilmor v. S· - Lake City, 32 Ut0>,
1
, 89 P. 71L' . 12 1 •. \.A. (N.S.), 537,
wl ce this cou !:". ci t2d with appl'oval tr..
foJlowinq quota~ion from 20 A. & E. Enc.
Law, 1193:
'The r•1le is ger-.e~ · that a municipal
corporati• ~ is no~ lial ~ for alleged
tortious i~juries to the persons or property
of indiviC~als, when engaged in the performance of public or governmental funct:ions or
duties.
So far as municipal corporations
exercis,~ powers con f-. .:rc.:.:l on tnem for purpo,;es
essentially pu':l.ic:, ·.:wy stand, as does
sovereignty \vhose a·.:nts they are, and are not
liable to be sued fc· any act or omi.ssion
occu :-ring while i:c tne exercise of ;;1ch powers,
unless by some s' •.1te the right of action be
given.
And, wherce he part .. cular enterprise
is purely a matter oE public service for the
generc•.l and common good, it Qakes no difference
whether it is mandatory or whether only permitted
and voluntarily undertaken.'"l Id. at 1102-1103.
< ..

From the earlier cases to the present, this Court has
·ntly upheld

th~

cons~~-

doctrine of governmental immunity,

including its application in the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, as a viable defense to suit brought against the State.

l.

This langt•age clearly implies '-~'solute i·. cmnity for the
sovereigP state, and only add~ :;2d the ,overnm~ntal
versus p .)prietary distinctic.· oecause t>e named defendant was a city corporation.
lil any event, the instant
case involved state prison officers who were clearly
en gag• . : in the purely governmental function of prison
operation.

-

11 -
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See:

Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.

105 (1960)

2

;

~mery v. _§tate, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483

P.

2d 1296 (lg)

Anderson Investment Con). v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379,

503 P. 2d:

(1972); Rosendaal Cr,:"lstruction and Mining Corp. v. Holman, 28
Utah 2d 396, 503 P. 2d 446 (1972); Holt v. Utah State ?oad
Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P. 2d 1286 (1973); Stale Road
Commission v. Tanner, 30 Utah 2d 19, 512 P. 2d 1022
Rapp v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 527 P. 2d 651 (1974);

(1973);
~eenhalgh

Payson City. Utah, 533 P. 2d 799 (1975)3; and Epting v. ~'
546 P. 2d 242

(1976).

On several previous occasions, this Court was presented
with the identical request presented by appellants in the
instant case, a request to abolish the Utah Governmental Irnrnun·
ity Act and the doctrine of governmental immunity as bei J
unconstitutional, archaic, and no longer viable.

On each

occ~

sian, the Court rejected the position.

In Davis v. Provo City Corporation, 1 Utah 2d 244, 265
P. 2d 415 (1953), the Court stated:
"The question of whether or not the doctrine
of immunity from suit when the city is acting in
its governmental capacity should be discarded entirely hds been considered by this court several times
with the majority concluding
2

The Fairclough opinion traces Utah case history up to II
on the issue of governmental immunity.
3
As a collateral matter, the Greenhalgh opinion discuss~
factors which are considered in determining the diffeu:
between a governmental and proprietary function and saU.
that a primary factor is "whether the activity is some~
which is done for the general public good and which is
generally regarded as a public respo~sibili ty" and "w~e:
there is any special pecuniary beneflt to the (c·lty).
Clearly, under the above guidelines, the instan~ case
involved
governmental
rather
thanof Museum
proprietary
funct~
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that the matter was properly within the
province of the legislature. There are
valid reasons for protecting the municipality from vexations and groundless
suits; the doctrine of immunity in absence
of statute is ancient and well-established
in our law; and limits of liability can be
imposed by the legislature where we are
powerless to do so. For these reasons we
believe that the doctrine must be enforced
until the time when the legislature takes
action providing for the bringing of suits
not encompassed in U.C.A. 1953, 10-7-77."
Likewise, in Ramirez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P. 2d
463 (1955), the Court held:
"From time to time certain judicial
expressions have been uttered questioning
the soundness of that rule as a matter of
policy. Whatever its desireability or
undesireability may be, it has long been
firmly established in our law by rulings
of the majority of this court. In deference
to stare decisis, we do not now feel at
liberty to consider its merits or demerits.
Any change would be properly with the province of the Legislature."
In Campbell v. Pack, 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P. 2d 464
(1964), in responding to a plaintiff's contention that the
doctrine of governmental immunity should be changed, the Court
held in a per curiam decision:
"With due deference to the authorities
cited, and the reasoning set forth by them
we are not persuaded of the propriety of
judicially changing this rule, which is
adhered to by a majority of our sister
states. See Anno. 86 A.L.R. 2d 480, et seq.
It has always been the law of this state
and the activities, operations and contracts
of the state government and other public
-13 for
- digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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entities protccte2 by it are bosed upon that
undersl._:cding of _,,_, laH.
For the rea:.ons
set fort_;1 in the
;cs heretofore deci ~d by
this court referr
to a~ove, we believe that
if there is to be a change which would have
such an important effect unon pub~ic institutions and their operatio ;s, it s:wuld be
left en' ~rely to the legislature to determine
whether
· -" imrn.uni ty should be renoved; and
as to wha~ age•· ~i,~; when e~fective, and to
wha+: extent, if a;,,, limite~ :io1·; should be
prescribed." Id. at 465.
Likev1ise, in Wile2d 78, 484 P. 2d 1200

v. Salt

Uta~

City Coin., 26

(1971), a plaintiff asserted, as in

instant case, that the Utah Governll'_ent3.l Immunity
be c' _)lished altogether".

Ac'::.

t~

should

• as being archaic and doing so

judicially to legislate our Gover:n<1ent Immunity Act out of
ezi.stence."

Justice Henriod, with Justices Callister, Tuckett,

Ellett, and Crockett concurring, res?onded:
"This last contention we are
not inclined to espouse, ir, spite
of a claimed trend in that direction,
noted by plaintiffs' adversions to
scholarly papers written by eminent
educators, and tt.• judicl. l pronouncements of some sis" ;r stat.'s."
Counsel for appellants doing nothing new, and i - doing
nothing more than seeking judie

1 legislation, which the

Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to condone.
This Court has also cited sound policy reasons for
supporb •
Blonqu~>t

the doctrine of gove •_-r,mental immunity.
v. Surnm

In

_County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 481 P.2d 430

--------

(1971), the Court noted:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"It is of great importance to public
to the governmental unit they act
1n behalf of, and even more important to the
stability and efticiency of government, that
public officials should not be held liable for
damages for acts done in good faith in the performance of their duties where the exercise of
any discretion is involved even though they may
make a mistake in judgment. The general law is
quite uniformly to that effect.
* * * It would be quite impractical and
unfair to require them to act at their own
risk.
This would not only be disruptive of the
proper functioning of public institutions,
but undoubtedly would dissuade competent and responsible persons from accepting the responsibilities of public office. Accordingly, it is
the settled policy of the law that when a public
official acts in good faith, believing what he does
to be within the scope of his authority and in the
line of his duty, he is not liable for damages
even if he makes a mistake in the exercise of his
judgment." 483 P. 2d at 434, 436.
~fficials,

Likewise, in Sheffield v. Turner, 2 Utah 2d 314,
445 P. 2d 367 (1968), the Court stated that there is:
. the imperative need for those able
in a supervisory capacity to have reasonable
freedom to discharge the burdensome responsibilities of keeping in confinement and maintaining
discipline of a large number of men who have been
convicted of serious crime.
If such officials are
too vulnerable to lawsuits for anything untoward
which may happen to inmates a number of evils follow, including a breakdown of discipline, and the
fact that capable persons would be discouraged
from taking such public positions."
An additional policy concern was expressed in McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed., Sec. 53.24:
"The reason (for immunity) as often expressed, is one of public policy, to protect public funds and public property.
"Taxes are raised for

- 15 provided
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certain spr·:ific crovernmentill p\
'J'o•'s;
and 1 if thL i c;OU ' be r~ l VE'rted
,](.'
payment ,,,r:
'-r~; c!-,~\\age cl2im ·,
t
_·ore
import
·.·:ork <·:: governme~
1- · i.ch E'Very
munici~~
~y msst p:rfarm I
1arJless of
its othc relations, would je seriously
impairec if not totc.lly desc:royed. '"
Respondents s.bmit that there are additional compelling
rea . .1s for retention of immunity in situations sucL ..os
the

l~stant

case.

The

thro~

reha 1 llitate inmates
tr ,, ining programs.
vi~~ts,

probation

rr0]~rn

trend in corrections is to

' vocational and educational

1ilork release,

school release, home

and pa;ole are current methods

t

.~d.

It is a practical impossibility to pro>ide twentyfo,

h:,ur guard supervision of inmates on such programs.

Thus, if governmental immunity is not applied to protect
these programs, they· will have to be terminated.

Sec:·;dlv,

the i:rmnuni ty frees the correctional eJ,l.ployees from the fear
of retaliation so as to allow them to function freely and
give independent discharge of their duties, as stated in
Sheffield.
Men· · ·m should be made of appellants' use of Brown
v. l'!ichita

(1975).
1\ans _

~·tate

~_!_y_,

Univ(

217 Kan. 279, 540 P. :d 66

ted for the proposition that t:1e

The case was

o: :pn···e Court voided the ·, •nscts legislative

provi:c:ions rc,•garding gove nmental immunity
-

aS

a violation

lE -
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o£ equal protection.
that the only

provi~

~

carerul reading of the case reveals
voided w~rc those dealing with the

proprietary activiti~~ ~f goverr~ent, i.e., those activities
carried on forth·~ specific benefit of a lr:cal cormnunity
or which . re generally

:rforrned by the private sector

for profit.
"Having declared the doctrine
governmental inmunity as coclified
in K.S.A. 46-901, 902 to be consti
tutionally void, equality ret~cns in
regard to the responsibility " all levels
of government in this state
-~
engaged in oroorietarv activ: :es.
Ho1rever, by '-'r::ualizing respo:=.·s::_;Jility
we are confro~ted ~ith the fical
question pre~2nted in this appeal.
Is
the transpor~ing of football players,
university personnel and interested
alumni to a scheduled intercolleg i.ate
away football game a govern~ental or
proprietary function?"
(Em~hasis added.)
The Kansas Suprc:.;ne Court went on to state its acceptance of
the doctrine of governmental irmnunity v1ith respect to
governmental activities, i.e.,

goverr~ental

activity

carried on for the common good of the general public (e.g.,
the maintenance and operation of a state correctional facility).
"Nevrrtheless, we believe the
governme::tal-o>:oor ieta rv disti nctio_r
still has vi tc-.: ~-~·
Implicit in t' ·
distinction is ·~e recognition that
it 'is not a to:.·t for govermr.ent to
govern. '
(Jackson, J., dissenting in
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,
57, 73 S.Ct. 956, 979, 9/ L. Ed. 1427.)
Deoendi• ' uool! the faci:s and circumstances
in~olved; the distinction can serve either
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to place go?er~~e~t in the shoes of the
private tortfe~sor, or to li~it government liabilit~.
For example, under the
distinction the state is not exposed to
liability as to legislative or lUdicial
action or inaction, or administrative
action or inaction, of a legislative or
judlclal cast.
Nor is the state liable
in matters involving the exercise of
official judgment or dlscretion.
(Willis, et al v. Dept. of Cons. & Ec.
Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34. See Wood v.
Strickland, 420 u.s. 308, 95 s.ct. 99-2-,-43 L.Ed. 2d 214 (1975).)"
(Emphasis added.)
See Utah Code Ann.

§

63-30-3

(1953), which limits immunity

to governmental functions.

POINT II
APPELLANTS' c;;.USE OF ACTION .ii.ROSE OUT OF AN
INCARCERATION AND THE STATE OF UTAH IS,
THEREFORE, IMl.:UNE FROM LIABILITY UNDER UTAH
CODE ANN., § 63-30-10 (10) (1953).
As indicated in Point I, the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act should be judicially construed so as to
preserve the presumption of sovereign immunity intended
by the legislature.
Utilizing this strict standard of construction,
an examination must be made of Utah Code Ann.

§

63-30-10

That statute provides, as follows:
"Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or ommission of
- 18 -
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(10).

a~ employee committed
h~s employment except

within the scope of
if the injury:

(10) arises out of the incarceration
of any person in any state prison, county
or city jail or other place of legal confinement • . • . "
(Emphasis Added.)
Respondents submit that the language of Subsection (10) is
clear on its face and was intended to preclude suits
against the state in situations such as the present case.
In the alternative, respondents submit that the meaning
of the terms "arises out of," incarceration;" and "other
place of legal confinement;" must be strictly construed by
this Court with a presumption in favor of preserving
governmental immunity, as set forth in Point I.
Appellants concede that Hr. !l!adsen was legally
confined in the State Prison at the time of his death.
A prison is not just four walls with bars on the windows.
Other basic functions essential to the sustaining of man
are required to be performed for persons confined in a
prison.

Facilities for food preparation and medical

attention as well as facilities for exercising the body
and mind are part of the prison.
Respondents submit that occurrences in the various
suboperations necessary for a complete prison facility
are also covered by a statute providing for injuries
arising out of incarceration of persons at a state prison.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Several recent Utah cases have shed judicial
light on Utah Code Ann.,

§

63-30-10 (10).

In a 1976

Utah case, Epting v. Utah, 546 P.2d 24.2 (1976), this
Court was faced with the question of whether a murder
committed by an escaped prisoner from a work-release
program arose "out of the incarceration

. in any

state prison, • • . or other place of legal confinement."
The Court held the state immune from suit arising out
of this incident.
Although the Court chose to base its holding on
subsection 1 of Section 63-30-10 and held the state
immune becuase the supervision of a work-release program
arose out of the exercise of a

discre~ionary

function,

Justice Crockett commented that Paragraph 10 might also
be applicable.

In speaking to the point of whether the

escaped convict inflicted injuries \'lhich arose out of
incarceration in the

s~ate

prison, Justice Crockett stated:

• • As to the status of Michael Hart
vis-a-vis the state prison, there seem to be
just two alternatives, either:
(a) He had
totally escaped the control of the prison
and was thus acting on his own so the
prison was not responsible for him; or
(b) he was still under the control of
the prison authorities so that his conduct
would 1 arJ.se out of the J.ncarceL·atJ.on of
any person in (the) state prison . . . . 1
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in which latter instance the prison is
inunune from suit under the statute."
(Emphasis added.)
(546 P.2d at 244)
Justice Crockett seems to be saying that where a prisoner
is still under control of prison authorities, incidents
thereto "arise out of incarceration," and the state is
immune from suit as per Section 63-30-10(.10).

In

Sheffield v. Turner, supra, the Court was faced with
deciding whether Warden Turner of the state prison was
immune under Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-10(10), for
injuries to an inmate within the prison.

In this case,

Chief Justice Crockett stated:
"Inasmuch as the statutes just referred
to plainly retain sovereign immunity to the
state for any injury arising out of incarceration in the prison, the trail court correctly
dismissed the complaint as to it • • • • "
(Id. at 368)
Another Utah case dealing with Section 63-30-10(10),
Utah Code Annotated, is Emery v. State of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 1,
483 P.2d 1296 (1971), in which this Court decided whether
or not a state hopsital qualified as "another place of
legal confinement."

Justice Henroid stated that the Court

was of the opinion that, in reading the whole section,
the words "other place of legal confinement" obviously
referred to something other than a jail or state prison,
including a hospital where one cannot be released without
- 21 -
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some kind of permission.

Surely,

a private person volun-

tarily undergoing surgery within a prison facility must
also fall within this provision, thus the state is immune
from suit.
Respondents assert under such circumstances that the
state prison and all the necessary auxiliary functions
thereof, including the operation of the prison hospital,
are governmental functions under the definition provided
in Point VII, infra, and the cases therein.

Consequently,

the performance of the duties incident thereto are
protected by the traditional rule of sovereisn immunity.
Such protection does not constitute a complete
shield for anything that may be done or permitted in prison.
In Sheffield v. Turner, supra, the Court held that the warden
and other prison officers are protected by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity against claims of negligence so long as
they are acting within the scope of their duties and in good
faith, and that they could not be held liable unless they
were guilty of some conduct which transcended the bounds of
good-faith performance of their duty by a willful or a
malicious wrongful act which they know, or should have
would result in injury.

-

22 -
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kno~,

This analysis of subsection 10, provides an interpretation which protects the State under sovereign immunity,
and permits liability only against individuals whose conduct
transcends the bounds of good faith performance of a duty
at the prison.
Based on Utah Code Ann.

§ 63-30-10(10), appellants

have no cause of action because the government has not waived
immunity for negligent acts or omissions of employees which
were committed within the scope of their employment where
the resulting injury arose out of the person's incarceration
in the state prison.

POINT III
THE INJURY TO MR. MJI.DSEN IS WITHIN THE
CONSTITUTION OF SUBSECTION 10 OF SECTION
63-30-10 AND THE COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED
THE STJI.TUTE.
Appellants allege in Point III of their brief that the legislative history of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10)
compels a narrow reading of subsection (10).

(1953)

Respondents

submit that the dialogue quoted by appellants reveals a
decision by the legislature to protect the state from lawsuits exactly like the present one.

The comment by

Senator Welch which is quoted and underlined at page 26 of
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appellants' brief logically refers to claims by inmates that
they received improper treatment at the prison hospital.
This reference is especially reasonable when the alleged
mistreatment is a discretionary matter involving medical
judgment.

Under the circumstances of this case where

Mr. Madsen requested surgery and did not inform the operating
physicians or medical technician of any unusual chest pains
or prior heart problems the resultant medical treatment was
reasonable and should not subject the state to liability
because of Mr. Madsen's death.
Appellants cite Sheffield v. Turner, 2. Ut. 2d 314,
445 P.2d 367

(1968) to show that gcvernrnental immunity "does

not constitute a carte blanche protection for anything that
may be done or permitted in a prison."
with that proposition.

Respondents agree

If a guard brutally assaults an

inmate governmental immunity offers no protection.

If a

medical technician or physician is recklessly or grossly
negligent in treating an inmate governmental immunity may
not shield such treatment.
Respondents contend, however, that the conduct in
this case was clearly "the performance of duties incident
(to a governmental function)" and therefore covered by the
Governmental Immunity Act.
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POINT IV
DEFENDANT STATE \'lAS PERFORMING A
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION AS PER UTAII
CODE ANN, § 63-30-10 (1) (1953) I AND,
THEREFORE, IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Section 63-30-10(1), Utah Code Ann.

(1953) as

amended reads, in part:
"Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or ommission of an
employee committed within the scope of his
employment except if the injury:
(1) arises out of the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function,
whether or not the discretion is abused.
(Emphasis added.)
The above statute provides immunity from the types of
activity alleged by appellants.
Judicial interpretation of what constitutes a
discretionary function when performed by public officials
has been extensive across the country.
Decisions on this issue have been influenced by the
purposes of the sovereign immunity doctrine as mentioned
Point I.

For example:

i~

In NeCasek v. City of Los Angeles,

233 Cal. App.2d 131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965), it was said:
"Since obviously no mechanical
separation of all activities in which
public officials may engage as being
either discretionary or ministerial
is possible, the determination of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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category into which a particular activity
falls should be g~ided by the purpose of
the discretionar immunity doctr1.ne."
Emphas1.s added.).
In Garner v. Rathburn, 346 F.2d 55 (lOth Cir. 1965), the
Court defined the discretionary function as being an
activity done within the framework of official duty
"involving exercise of discretion which public policy
requires be made without fear of personal liability."
(Emphasis added.)
This Court followed the above mentioned line of case
in Sheffield v. Turner, supra, where an inmate at the state
prison injured another inmate. The Court recognized the need
for supervisors at the prison to be free to discharge the
burdensome responsibilities of supervising confinement and
maintaining discipline without being susceptible to lawsuits
covering every activity of such men in a pressure-filled
situation.
A leading case dealing with the meaning of the word
"discretion" as it applies to sovereign immunity is
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 965 (1953).
There, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting
Section 2680 of the Federal Tort Claims Act (which, in
part, reads:

"any claim • .

. based upon the exercise or

performance of a discretionary function or duty on the part
of . . . an employee of the Government . .
is exempt from governmental liability), held that acts done
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at the "planning" level were "discretionary," whereas those
done at the "operational" level were not.

The Court, however,

went on to specify what type of governmental acts went into
the "planning" level by specifically holding that the negligent acts in question (i.e., fertilizer bag labeling,
determining bag temperature, coating of fertilizer, and
bagging) done by government employees were themselves
"planning" and thus "discretionary" since they "involved
considerations more or less important to the practicality of
the Government's fertilizer program" and were pursuant to the
basic plan established by the "Field Director's Office."
The Court said:
. the discretionary function or duty
. includes more than the initiation of
programs and activities. It also includes
determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications, or schedules of operations. Where
there is room for policy judgment and
decision there is discretion.
It necessarily
follows that acts of subordinates in carrying
out the operations of government in accordance
with official directions cannot be actionable.
If it were not so, the protection of Section
2680 (a} would fail at a time it would be
needed, that is, when a subordinate performs
or fails to perform a causal step, each action
or nonaction being directed by the supervisor,
exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion."
Id. at 36.
(Emphasis added.)
Dalehite v. United States, supra, represents a definite
line of cases which hold that governmental activity
pursuant to or connected with the basic policy decisons
- 27
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at the "planning" level is itself "planning" and thus within
the confines of "discretionary" immunity.

In Downs v.

United States, 382 F. Supp. 713 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), in an
action against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act arising out of an incident of air piracy in which
two people were

kille~

the Court, relying on Dalehite, supra,

stated:
"Despite the growing conviction that
the sovereign, like others, should be
accountable £or its wrongs, it seems
clear that the conduct of certain types
of governmental activity must remain free
from the effects of litigation. Basically,
the exemption for discretionary functions
seeks to insulate from judicial inquiry
the propriety of basic policy decisions
made by officials of coordinate branches
of government in whom are vested b:coad anC.
pervasive decision-making responsibility.
The rule contemplates those situations in
which a court cannot undertake to determine
the reasonableness of complex governmental
decisions. Also, implicit in the concept
of protection for discretionary acts is
the probable effect which potential liability
would have in dampening the ardor of those
charged with the formulation and execution
of governmental programs. The t.est for
immunity, then, should be whether injury
inflicted as a result of government action
can be subjected to judicial review without
thereby jeopardizing the quality and efficiency of government itself.
"Under these standards, it is clear that
the substance of any hijacking plan or procedure
formulated by the Department of Justice
through theFBI or its executive officials could
not be the subject of civil litigation under
the Tort Claims Act. This would be true
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even though the plan called for activity
clearly negligent adjudged by traditional
tort principles. Horeover, in order to
achieve the purposes for which exempt~on
from liability is deemed necessary, it is
obvious 1 that a'cts of subordinates in
carry1ng out the operations of government
in accordance with official directions
cannot be actionable.' Daleh~te v. United
States, supra, 346 u.s. at 36, 73 s.ct. at 968.
Thus, as urged by the Government, it is
of no real moment that the allegedly negligent governmental agents in this case were
operating at the 'field' level rather than at
policy-making level."
(Emphasis added.}
In Sullivan v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 713
N.D. 111, 1955}, in an action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the United States District Court held that any
activity of a government employee at the operational level
performed in accordance with the official plan or program
constitutes performance of a discretionary function since
its source is discretionary.
The Oregon Court of Appeals in Baker v. Straumfjard,
10 Ore. App. 414 500 P.2d 496 (1972), held that a state
employed doctor was immune under the state immunity statute
since the following acts, which the plaintiff alleged to
be the source of liability, were within the "discretionary"
function:
a.

Admitting plaintiff to the state university

hospital when plaintiff was suffering from a mental disturbance; and
-
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b.

Failing to supervise, guard, or attend him.

In Jarret v. Willis.
an

actio:~

235 Ore. 51, 383 J0.2d 995 (196 3),

was brought against the superintendent of a home

for the mentally deficient as the result of injuries inflicted
on the plaintiff by a resident on leave.

The Court held that

both the granting of leave of absence to the resident and
the superintendent's failure to provide adequate means of
supervision over the resident while on leave were within
the "discretionary" function of the superintendent.
The Court stated:
"His responsibilities require him to make
constant discretionary judgment.
Like the
Board of Parole and Probation or the Superin~
tendent of the State Hospital, he is required
as the State's keeper of these unfortunates
and in behalf of the state, to judge and
govern human beings and human conduct, a
judgment devoid of any of the standard weights
and measures available for the decisions made
by other public officials. There would be few
of his decisions that would not be discretionary."
Respondents submit that the subjective element in
treating and rehabilitating

prisor:,~rs

requires almost a

total concentration of effort in discretionary functions,
including, as in the instant case, allowing a prisoner to
undergo a personally requested'surgical procedure.
Medical treatment rendered by hospital personnel is
of necessity discretionary in nature. Broad

guidelines for

care can be provided but specific treatment' can only be
given in the context of specific medical circumstances.
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Since appellants h~ve not even alleged that the action
of respondents were deliberate and in wanton disregard of
definite rules of medical conduct, the alleged cause of
action fails under subsection 10 of the Utah Code Annotated,
Section 63-30-10, which retains immunity for injuries
caused by an employee acting within the scope of his employment when it arises out of the exercise of a discretionary
function, even if such discretion is abused.

POINT V
OPERATION OF A HOSPITAL FACILITY AT THE
STATE PRISON IS A GOVERUMENTAL FUNCTION
WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF THE UTAH
GOVERNHENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
This Court has considered in several opinions the distinctive criteria which determine what is a governmental
versusa proprietary function and, hence, what type of
activities carried on by a government entity are covered by
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

In the recent case of

Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 533 P.2d 799 (1975), this Court
held that an operation of a hospital facility by a municipality is a proprietary function not covered under the Governmental Immunity Act.

In this case, the Court reiterated four

important factors to consider in deciding whether an activity
is proprietary or governmental.
1.

The factors are:

Whether the activity is something which is done
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2.

>Vhether it is generally regarded as a public

responsibility;
3.

>Vhether there is any special pecuniary benefit

to the municipality; and
4.

>Vhether it is of such a nature as to be

in competition with free enterprise.
It is undisputed that the operation of a prison

faciU~

by the state government is a governmental function.
Therefore, the only issue before the court is whether the
operation of a prison hospital meets the four criteria set
down by the Supreme Court.

In the Sheffield case, supra,

this Court noted "the imperative need for those in a supervisory capacity to have reasonable freedom to discharge the
burdensome responsibilities of keeping in confinement and
maintaining discipline of a large number of men who have
been convicted of serious crime."

Respondents assert that

a prison warden in the exercise of his discretion in running
a prison hospital is doing so for the general public good.
The public good would seem to be best served if the prison
warden and the prison physicians were allowed to make their
independent judgments as to what type of medical attention
is to be given to individual inmates and where such treatment
should be given.
The second criterion given by the Court is whether
the disputed activity is generally regarded as a public
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responsibility.

The operation of a prison facility is clearly

a public responsibility, and it follows that the administration of the various programs and facilities within that
prison also are public responsibilities.
In the case of Ramirez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102,
279 P.2d 463 (1955), from which the court in Greenhalgh,
supra, extracted its four criteria, the Court noted that
"where the activity is otherwise consistent with the governmental function, the fact that a fee is exacted, nor that
there may be some incidental pecuniary benefit to the city,
are by themselves controlling."

A fortiori, if some pecuniary

benefit can be received by the governmental entity and still
pass this test, then the fact that no fees are extracted,
or pecuniary benefit is derived by the state from the
administration of this hospital, there can be no doubt
that the third criterion has been met.
The last criterion is whether the activity is of such
~

nature as to be in competition with free enterprise.

The

state prison hospital is not in competition with any part
of the free enterprise system, as there is nothing in the
private sector that specializes in the treatment of people
who have been removed from society by the court system and
the legislature.

The prison authorities have, in their

discretion, found it desirable and beneficial to the public
- digitization
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to maintain a state facility for treatment of
medical problems.

inma~es'

Due to the unique patients at this

hospital, prison authorities are best suited for determining how to best meet the prisoner's medical needs.
In no sense can it be said that in operating a
prison hospital, the state is trying to obtain some pecuniary
benefit in competition with the private sector.
Based on the guidelines given by the Supreme Court
in

Rami~,

supra, and reiterated in Greenhalgh, supra, it

is clear that the operation of a prison hospital within the
prison is strictly a governmental function as is the operation of the state prison itself, and is thus covered by the
Governmental Immunity Act.

This conclusion is supported

in Sheffield,supra, where the Court noted that, "there can
be no question but that the maintenance of the state prison
and the keeping of prisoners therein is a necessary auxiliary
of government, and, therefore, a governmental function, and
the performance of the duties incident thereto would normally
be protected by the traditional rule of sovereign immunity."
(445 P.2d at 368)
In light of the above language, the discretionary
actions of prison medical employees are immune as provided
in the Governmental Immunity Act and appellants 1 appeal should
be denied.
-
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POINT VI
RESPONDENTS SAMUEL H. SHITH, LEON HATCH,
TAGE SPONDECK, AND DOES 1 THROUGH 5 WERE
ACTING tVITHIN THE BOUNDS OF GOOD FAITH IN
PERFORMING THEIR DUTIES AND ARE THUS
IMMUNE FROM SUIT.
Respondents submit that three recent Utah cases
that deal with suits against government entities and their
employees in their private capacities provide immunity to
respondents in the instant case for the types of activities
alleged by appellants.

In the case of Sheffield v. Turner,

21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968), already discussed,
the court held that the prison warden and other prison
officers are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity
against claims of negligence, so long as they are acting
in good faith and within the scope of their duties.

Sheffield

also indicated that they could not be held liable unless
they were guilty of some conduct which transcended the
bounds of good-faith peformance of their duties by a willful
or malicious wrongful act which they knew or should have
known would result in injury.

The court reasoned that to

subject such officials to lawsuits for anything which may
happen to inmates would create a number of evils, including
a breakdown of discipline and the likelihood that capable
persons would be discouraged from taking such public
positions.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
- for
35digitization
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the case of
taxpayer was

~inging

Rosendaal,

supr~,

in which a

suit against the members of the State

Tax Commission in their private capa,:ities, the Court held:
"It appears from the record in this
case that defendants in the matters herein
complained of by the plaintiff were
pursuing their duties in the collection of
excise taxes the defendants claim to be
due the state.
It also appears that the
acts complained of were performed in good
faith by the defendants and within the
statutory authority granted. The ruling
of the court below that the defendants
are not subject to suit for damages in
their private capacity is correct."
(Id.
at 448)
In a 1972 Utah case, Anderson Investment Corporation
v. the State of Utah, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144 (1972),
the plaintiffs sought to enjoin rr.·cmbers

of the State

Road Commission from proceeding to work on a viaduct before
theplaintiff had been paid the appropriate dollar damages
from his alleged diminution in value of easements to light
and air.

In Anderson, the Court held:

"In the instant suit, Anderson did
make the individual members of the commission parties defendants. • • • These
members in the performance of their duties
which have the same immunity as does the
commission which they constitute."
(Id.
at 146)
The above three cases clearly point out that
appellants improperly brought suit against the individual
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membe~s named in this action,

since they have not alleged

that any of the named respondents was guilty of any conduct
which transcended the bounds of good-faith performance of
their duties by a willful and malicious wrongful act which
they knew or should have known would have resulted in the
injury complained of.

The individuals named as party

respondents were properly dismissed by the lower court.

CONCLUSION
In summary, appellants have cited substantial case
authority, dicta, and commentary supporting the proposition
that absolute governmental immunity is archaic and without
legal foundation.

The Utah Legislature took this same

position many years ago when it enacted the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

The Act severed legal tradition by waiving

governmental immunity in many areas of governmental activity,
including the negligence of its own employees while retaining
immunity in certain areas deemed necessary by the legislature.
This same approach is followed by the United States in the
Federal Tort Claims Act and by the
states.

v~st

majority of the

Appellants have cited no controlling authority

requiring the complete abolition of the governmental immunity
doctrine and have failed to overcome the strong presumption
favoring the constitutionality of legislative enactments.
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This, coupled with this Court's traditional acceptance of
the governmental immunity doctrine in general and the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, specificially indicates that the
Act is constitutional and controlling in the instant case.
It should be noted that this Court was presented
with the identical legal claims in Epting v. State, supra,

in a petition for

rehearin~

This rehearing was denied.

Likewise, the same constitutional challenge was brought in
the Fourth Judicial District in Utah County in the case of
Mitchell v. State of Utah,

(Civil N. 42, 647, 4th District

Court of Utah, July 14, 1976) with the same result.

In

both instances above, the courts were presented with identical issues, case authority, etc. as is before this court,
challenging the constitutionality of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act and thus stare decisis dictates that appellants'
claim has already been decided in respondents' favor.
Therefore, appellants' appeal should be denied, and the lower
court decision affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
G. Blaine Davis
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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